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Abstract -  We study experimentally group cooperation under alternative peer punishment institutions. We 
find that (1) information about how much others have punished are irrelevant for punishment decisions; (2) 
when a coalition of at least two subjects in the group must agree before somebody is punished, group 
performance dramatically increases; we show that this institution reduces perverse punishment and 
encourages pro-social behavior. Furthermore, the results suggest that the strong emotional component that 
drives agents to punish alters their ability to behave strategically 
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    While peer punishment has been shown to increase group cooperation, there is open debate on 
how cooperative norms can emerge and on what motives drive individuals to punish. In this 
paper we address both topics by experimentally comparing alternative institutions of peer 
punishment.  
   When he welcomes the new employees, the CEO of Diesel introduces them to the company 
culture with the following words, “If you do not show competence in what you do, they all will 
walk over you. It will not be me to throw you out, but your very own peers.”
 1 We ignore the 
ways in which this threat is carried out. However, this strong work ethic has contributed to make 
Diesel an international success case among clothing companies. Forms of peer punishment are 
reported in many other field settings, including fishing communities where people doing 
excessive harvesting are the target of vandalisms of boats and fishing nets (Ostrom, 1996). 
Mining communities also use peer punishment such as social ostracism to discourage others 
from breaking strikes over working conditions (Francis, 1985). 
      While peer punishment in field contexts takes many forms, the experimental economic 
literature has focused on the very specific punishment technology that we call “Baseline,” where 
group members simultaneously choose if and how much to punish each member of the group 
without ever knowing the punishment choices of others and with wide discretionality on 
punishment choices (Ostrom et al., 1992, Fehr and Gaechter, 2000, 2002, Sefton et al., 2002, 
Bochet et al., 2002, Masclet et al., 2003). Important implications have been drawn from this 
punishment structure, but there are several reasons to examine alternative peer punishment 
technologies. First, variations in the technology of peer punishment may affect group 
                                                 
1 From an interview with the CEO of Diesel Renzo Rosso: “Look, here all the doors are open to you. You can climb 
the ladder or change tasks as much as you wish. But watch out: if you do not show competence in what you do, they 
all will walk over you. It will not be me to throw you out, but your very own peers,” 
 Stella (1996), pp.24-26, (our 
translation) Civil servants in some public administrations have equally strict norms but of the opposite sign, where 
shopping during office hours is allowed and hard working habits are discouraged.   2
performance.
2 We explore, for given social norms, how changing the punishment technology 
may lead to more or less group cooperation. If a manager can shape the way team members 
interact, it may be possible for the manager to increase total production without manipulating the 
workers’ social norms.  Second, alternative peer punishment technologies may shed light on the 
motives to punish. Third, it provides a check for robustness for existing studies. So far the only 
systematic exploration of the above peer punishment structure concerns changes in the relative 
cost of punishment (Carpenter, 2002, Andreoni et al., 2003, Putterman and Anderson, 2003).
3 
Our paper alters the structure of the technology along multiple dimensions.   
   In our experiment, subjects can voluntary contribute to a public good. There are treatments 
without punishment or with one of the following punishment technologies, “Baseline,” 
“Sequential,” or “Consensual.” When agents are motivated purely by personal monetary 
earnings, there should be no punishment and complete free riding in all treatments. We know 
from previous studies that this is not an accurate description of experimental results, but scholars 
have not settled on a single explanation. The Baseline technology implements a design similar to 
what is common in the literature and constitutes the benchmark to measure results from other 
technologies. Studying alternative punishment technologies, reveals, among other things, how 
subjects enforce their norms of cooperation. 
   Each person may bring her norms into the lab, i.e. standards of behavior about how individual 
group members ought to behave in a given situation. Hence, a group may face multiple norms, 
possibly conflicting ones. In the Baseline technology all requests to punish are carried out and 
the group outcome results from the mixed impact of all individual norms. Instead, in the 
                                                 
2 We do not touch the questions concerning the endogenous selection of a punishment institutions or how 
individuals self-select into a particular punishment institution. A fashinating study in this regard is Gürerk et al. 
(2004). 
3 For an interesting exception see Decker et al. (2003).   3
Consensual technology requests to punish are carried out only when there is a minimum coalition 
of two agents that share a norm. More precisely, at least two members in a group of five must 
agree on the individual(s) to target for punishment, although they can still disagree on the 
severity of the punishment. Similarly to the Baseline technology, individual norms are not 
imposed by the experimenter but are those of the participants. To some extent, the Consensual 
technology resembles to a legal system where laws are chosen or enforced only through social 
agreement. Group performance substantially improves under the Consensual peer punishment 
institution hence generating a “consensual dividend”. Both group cooperation and group net 
earnings are considerably higher under the Consensual than any other punishment rule studied. 
   In addition, we vary the information that subjects have about how much others have punished. 
In the Baseline treatments, group members decide simultaneously how much to punish a specific 
agent; in the Sequential treatment those decisions are taken one group member at a time. The 
group members that decide later on in the sequence learn about the cumulative amount of 
punishment already inflicted on that specific agent. They can decide how much additional 
punishment to assign. One may expect that this richer information set could have reshaped 
punishment choices, for example by improving coordination in punishing free riders. Instead, 
choices are surprisingly similar to the Baseline treatment. We call this the “coordination puzzle.” 
Possible interpretations of this result are put forward. 
  This paper is structured into four Sections. In Section 1 we describe the experimental design 
and the predictions. Aggregate results are presented in Section 2, while individual punishment 
decision results are presented in Section 3. Conclusions follow in Section 4. 
   4
1. The Experimental Design 
1.1. Basic Design 
   Our design consists of a public good experiment with three treatments of differing punishment 
technologies.
4 There are N=20 participants in each session. In every period the participants are 
randomly partitioned into four groups of n=5 individuals. In all treatments, subjects participate 
for twenty periods in a finitely repeated public good game with and without punishment 
opportunities. In the first ten periods there is no punishment opportunity while in the last ten 
periods there is. Punishment opportunities are structured in three different ways: Baseline, 
Consensual, and Sequential (Table 1). 
   In the Baseline treatment, once group members are informed about each member’s contribution 
to the public good, all punishment requests are simultaneously submitted. At a private cost of 
one token per punishment point, an agent can decrease the earnings of any other individual in her 
group by three tokens. In the case an agent receives punishment points from two or more agents, 
her earnings reduction is the cumulative effect of all requests. Punishment on a targeted agent is 
carried out irrespectively of the number of requests. This is a common protocol in the 
experimental literature, adopted, for instance, by Fehr and Gaechter (2000). 
   In the Consensual treatment, participants simultaneously place their punishment requests. If a 
subject is the target of the punishment request of just one other subject, that punishment request 
is ignored. When at least two group members request to punish a subject, their punishment 
requests are carried out. Subjects are informed of the outcome of their requests. 
   Finally, in the Sequential treatment, agents decide, in random order, one after another, on their 
punishment requests. As before, all requests are carried out, but every participant considers 
                                                 
4 The Instructions for the Consensual treatment can be found  in Appendix. The whole experiment was framed in 
neutral terms.   5
punishing each one of the other (n – 1) group members in (n – 1) separate steps. In step one, each 
subject places a punishment request. In step two, a subject knows that one other group member 
has already had the opportunity to punish the same individual and knows the cumulative amount 
of punishment already inflicted. The process continues for the remaining steps. Punishment 
points can be added but never subtracted. 
      The treatment without punishment opportunity serves as a control for the treatment with 
punishment opportunity. The same n subjects interact ten periods without punishment 
opportunities then ten periods with the opportunity to punish.
5 
1.2. Payoffs 
   In the treatments without punishment, in each period each of the n subjects in a group receives 
an endowment of y tokens. A subject can either keep these tokens for herself or invest gi tokens 
(0 ≤ gi ≤ y) into a project. The decisions about gi are made simultaneously. The period monetary 
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where a is the marginal per capita return from a contribution to the public good,  1/n < a <1. The 
total payoff from the no–punishment condition is the sum of the period–payoffs, as given in (1), 
over all ten periods. Note that (1) implies that full free–riding (gi = 0) is a dominant strategy in 
the stage game. This follows from  i i g ∂ ∂ / 1 π = – 1 + a < 0. However, the group payoff ∑ =
n
i i 1
1 π  is 
maximized if each group member fully cooperates (gi = y) because  i
n
i i g ∂ ∂∑ = / 1
1 π = – 1 + na > 0. 
  The major difference between the no–punishment and the punishment conditions is the addition 
of a second decision stage after the Simultaneous contribution decision in each period. At the 
                                                 
5 We ran three additional sessions where the ten periods with punishment opportunities were placed before the ten 
periods without the punishment opportunity. These results are not reported here.   6
second stage, subjects are given the opportunity to punish each other after they are informed 
about the individual contribution of the other group members. Group member j can punish group 
member i by assigning so–called punishment points p
i
j to i. There are three different treatments 
for the part with punishment opportunities. 
   In the Baseline (Simultaneous) treatment for each punishment point assigned to i the first–stage 
payoff of i,  1
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the effectiveness of punishment function. For punishment points given to others, agent i’s payoff 








i is the cost of punishment. This design has the 




k) constant – and equal to 3 – in order 
not to alter the “price” of punishment.
6 The pecuniary payoff of subject i from both stages,  i π , 
can therefore be written as: 
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The total payoff from the punishment condition is the sum of the period–payoffs, as given in (2), 
over all ten periods. 
      In the Consensual treatment, punishment is Simultaneous and employs the same cost and 
effectiveness functions as before. However, an agent is punished only if at least two agents 
requested it. Hence, the payoff function for both stages is: 
                                                 
6 The reason is to avoid confounding effects in the interpretation of results due to differential “pricing” of 
punishment. For the same reason we allowed period earnings of a subject to be negative. Not doing so would have 
increased the fine-to-fee ratio of the marginal punisher. In the experiment, negative period earnings were infrequent. 
When ignoring the punishment given to others, it amounts to 3.3% of the observations with punishment 
opportunities. Cumulative earnings were always positive.   7
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k i I  and K(i) = 0 otherwise. The function I(i,k) equals one when 
agent k requests to punish agent i, p
i
k >0, and equals zero otherwise. In practice, only a coalition 
of 40% of group members or larger is allowed to punish a member. Isolated requests to punish 
agent i have no effect and no cost is charged for that request. If the punishment request is not 
carried out then the requesting subject is informed about it and the targeted subject will not know 
of such request. 
   In the Sequential treatment the payoffs are given by (2) like in the Baseline treatment but the 









i} are broken down into (n–1) distinct steps where at step k agent i makes a single 
decision p
j(k)
i. The order of punishment decisions j(k) is random and such that within the period 
agent i has an opportunity to target all other agents in the group, {j(1),…, j(n-1)}={1,…, i-1, 
i+1,…,n}. After each step, there is an update on the cumulative punishment received by each 
agent in the group. 
B.  Parameters and Information Conditions 
      The  experiment  is  conducted  in  a  computerized laboratory where subjects anonymously 
interact with each other.
7 No subject is ever informed about the identity of the other group 
members. No communication among subjects is allowed. In all treatment conditions the 
endowment is given by y = 20, groups are of size n = 5, the marginal payoff of the public good is 
fixed at a = 0.4, and the number of participants in a session is N = 20. In each period subject i 
can assign up to seven punishment points pi
j to each group member j, with j ≠i irrespective of 
                                                 
7 For conducting the experiments we used the experimental software “z-Tree” developed by Urs Fischbacher (1998).   8
their first stage earnings. In all treatment conditions subjects are publicly informed that the 
condition lasts exactly  for ten periods. When subjects play the no–punishment opportunity 
condition they know that a session consists of two conditions but do not know the rules for the 
second condition. After period ten of the first condition in a session, they are informed that there 
will be a “new experiment” and that this experiment will again last exactly for ten periods. They 
are also informed that the experiment will then be definitely finished.
8 
   In the no–punishment conditions the payoff function (1) and the parameter values of y, n, N, 
and a are common knowledge. At the end of each period subjects in each group are informed 
about the total contribution Σgj to the project in their group. 
In the punishment conditions the payoff function (2) or (3), in addition to y, n, N, a, and the 
protocol of the punishment requests are common knowledge. Furthermore, after the contribution 
stage subjects are also informed about the whole vector of individual contributions in their 
group. To prevent the possibility of individual reputation formation across periods each subject’s 
own contribution is always listed in the first column of his or her computer screen and the 
remaining four subjects’ contributions are listed without subject ID in the other four columns. 
Thus, subject i does not have the information to construct a link between individual contributions 
of subject j  across periods. Therefore, subject j cannot develop a reputation for a particular 
individual contribution behavior. This design feature also rules out that i punishes j in period t 
for contribution decisions taken in period t’ < t. Subjects know their own punishment activities, 
the aggregate punishments imposed on them by the other group members, and the aggregate 
punishment imposed on other group members.
9 
                                                 
8 Each condition was preceded by a trial period to familiarize the subjects with the software. 
9 This provision can make a difference when subjects do not know the preferences of others. When a subject can 
only observe the punishment points she gave or received (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000), learning about these   9
   In the Sequential punishment treatment subjects know at what step they are and the cumulative 
aggregate punishment imposed on each other group members up to the previous step. Hence, 
they receive more detailed information about punishment than in the Baseline treatment because 
they can see both the end-of-period sum and some disaggregated statistics about the individual 
components of this sum. However, they are not informed about the amount of punishment they 
have personally received until the end of the period. In all treatments, subjects are also not 
informed about the individual punishment requests of the other group members. Both provisions 
are meant to prevent, as much as possible, a subject from using punishment to payback others for 
their requested punishments.  
1.3. Predictions 
      The canonical predictions for the experimental conditions just outlined are well known. If 
subjects apply the backward induction logic, the equilibrium prediction in all three treatments is 
that all subjects will contribute nothing to the public good and will punish nothing. In fact, 
choosing p
j
i>0 is a monetary cost that does not generate any monetary benefit in a one-shot 
interaction. In the experiment the probability that an agent was re-matched with the same four 
people was less than 2 percent. 
 
2. Aggregate Results 
   A total of 240 subjects were recruited among the general undergraduate student population of 
the University of (omissis) via ads posted around campus asking to email or call. No subject had 
participated in this type of experiment before, and each subject participated in only one of the 
experimental sessions. Twelve sessions were conducted between March and October 2003. Each 
                                                                                                                                                             
preferences may be slower than here. In our setting, a subject can see if a social norm was enforced with respect to 
any other subject in her group.   10
session lasted between 1 hour and 50 minutes and 2 hours and 30 minutes including instructions. 
Payment was done privately in cash at the end of each session and totaled 12.40 euros per subject 
on average.
10 
   The results are grouped into two sections, this one referring to aggregate cooperation and net 
payoff (Results 1-3) and the next one concerning individual decisions to punish (Results 4-5). 
      When subjects have the opportunity to punish, contributions to the public good increase 
(Result 1) and stay high over time (Result 2). In addition to replicating these well-known results, 
we also find sharp differences regarding group cooperation levels and group net earnings 
according to the punishment technology used. In particular, group cooperation (contribution) and 
group net earnings are highest in the Consensual treatment (Result 3).  
RESULT 1: The existence of punishment opportunities causes a rise in the average contribution 
level from 17% to 29% of the endowment. In particular, while the average contribution rises in 
all treatments, the rise is largest in the Consensual treatment.  
RESULT 2: In the no-punishment condition average contributions converge over time close to 
full free riding. In contrast, in the punishment condition average contributions are stable or 
increasing over time. In particular there is a steady growth in contribution levels in the 
Consensual treatment.  
      Support for Results 1 and 2 comes from Table 2 and Figure 1. Without a punishment 
opportunity the average individual contribution across all treatments is 3.31 tokens. When the 
opportunity to punish is introduced, the average individual contribution across all treatments is 
5.77. A nonparametric Wilcoxon signed ranks test shows that this difference in contributions is 
significant at the one percent level (p=0.0061). These average values hide a declining trend when 
                                                 
10   At the October 2003 rate of $1.17 per euro, it is equivalent to $14.50. This amount includes the show up fee that 
was 3 euros for the four sessions conducted before October and 5 euros afterwards. The amounts in the instruction 
were quoted in “Tokens.” A token was converted into 0.02 euros.   11
there are no opportunities to punish - from 5.92 tokens in period one to 1.82 in period ten. With 
punishment opportunities there is a “jump” in period eleven when there is an average 
contribution of 5.21 tokens and an ascending trend to 6.50 in period twenty. This jump in 
contribution between the last period without punishment and the first period with punishment is 
significant at a one percent level according to a Wilcoxon signed ranks test (p=0.0002). 
   Besides these common patterns, each punishment technology shows remarkable peculiarities. 
Overall contributions under a Consensual technology are substantially higher than in the other 
two (8.46 vs. 4.46 Baseline and 4.38 Sequential).
11 Moreover, while the time trend is increasing 
for the Consensual technology (period one-ten, 6.94-9.76), it is roughly stationary for the other 
two (4.01-5.65 Baseline, 4.62-4.10 Sequential). Such differences are summarized by the analysis 
of relative payoff gains with and without punishment in Result 3. 
RESULT 3: In all treatments punishment opportunities initially cause a relative payoff loss. The 
Consensual treatment is the only treatment in which relative payoff gains are found, more 
precisely in the final four periods. In the final period of the Consensual treatment the relative 
payoff gain is 13 percent. In the Baseline and Sequential treatments the relative payoff losses 
remain throughout all periods, although they become smaller over time. In the final period of the 
Baseline and Sequential treatments the relative payoff loss is roughly 20 percent.  
   Support for Result 3 comes from Table 2 and Figure 2. Normalizing the earnings in the final 
period of the no punishment condition to 100, then earnings in the first period with punishment 
are equal to 57 in the Baseline treatment, 53 in the Sequential, and 85 in the Consensual. By the 
end of the session, all of these values have increased. While the Baseline is at 80 and the 
Sequential is at 78, which are still below the reference value without punishment, the Consensual 
                                                 
11 A non parametric Wilcoxon signed ranks test  shows that the difference in contributions with and without sanction 
opportunities between the Consensual treatment on one side and the other two treatments on the other side is 
significant at a ten percent level (p=0.0768).    12
treatment is above, at 113. A Wilcoxon signed ranks test shows that the differences in group net 
earnings between the last period with and without sanction opportunities are significantly 
different in the Consensual treatment compared to the other two treatments at a five percent level 
(p=0.0364). 
   Interestingly, the high cooperation level of the Consensual treatment was achieved with the 
lowest level of punishment among all treatments. This is the key point that accounts for its 
superiority in terms of group net earnings. Let us define the “punishment rate” as the number of 
punishment points assigned to a particular contribution action. The average punishment rate is 
∑∑ ∑ =≠ ⋅ 10
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Consensual. The average punishment rate was 1.70 in the Consensual compared to 2.47 in the 
other two treatments (Figure 3). This difference persists after adjusting for the variations in 
group contribution across treatments (Table 3). For any given contribution level, lower 
punishment rates translate into a smaller deadweight loss. One reason for the lower punishment 
rate is that all punishment requests made by just one agent were ignored. Had those requests not 
been ignored, the punishment rate in the Consensual treatment would have been 29.5 percent 
higher than our reported rate (full sample, Figure 3).  
   What cries for an explanation is how a lower threat of punishment observed in the Consensual 
treatment could provide not weaker but stronger incentives to cooperate that in the other 
treatments.  The reason is that the Consensual technology endogenously filtered out the anti-
social norm of a minority that was targeting cooperators, thus enhancing the incentives to 
cooperate. While less than one out of every ten requests to target full free-riders was censored, 
more than seven out of ten attempts to punish strong cooperators with contributions (15,20] were   13
blocked. Table 3 provides more details.
12 The Baseline and Sequential technology instead 
allowed a minority to freely harm strong cooperators and hence lower incentives for cooperation.  
   To provide additional statistical evidence for this explanation and to facilitate the comparison 
with Fehr and Gaechter (2000) we also present a regression analysis of punishment behavior. As 
a complement to the use of absolute contribution levels employed in Table 3, this analysis also 
captures the effect of punishment on subjects’ relative contributions in respect to the group 
average. Table 4 contains a model and an ordinary least-squared (OLS) regression where the 
dependent variable is “received punishment points” of a subject and the independent variables 
comprise “strong cooperator”, “others’ average contribution”, “positive deviation” and “absolute 
negative deviation”, respectively.  The latter variable is the absolute value of the actual deviation 
of a subject’s contribution from the others’ average in case that his or her own contribution is 
below the average. This variable is zero if the subject’s own contribution is equal or above the 
others’ average. The variable “positive deviation” is constructed analogously. The variable 
“strong cooperator” is one if the subject’s contribution is above fifteen tokens and zero 
otherwise. This variable retains the absolute scale of the contribution level and may capture the 
tendency, mentioned above, to target highly cooperative subjects. The model also includes 
period and session dummies. In all treatments, the coefficient of the “absolute negative 
deviation” is positive and significant at the one percent level. This result reinforces the 
conclusion that free riders can reduce the received punishment by increasing their contributions. 
Although the positive coefficient is not significant, in the Baseline and Sequential treatment, 
strong cooperators were targeted for punishment. However, in the Consensual treatment, strong 
                                                 
12 Results in Table 3 are for a subsample only. The data support this point even more strongly when one considers 
the full sample.   14
cooperators were less likely to receive punishment (significant at the 10 percent level). This 
result holds when controlling for the relative contribution with respect to the group. 
   What stands out in the analysis of group cooperation levels across treatments is the superiority 
of the Consensual technology. This technology generated punishment costs 10 percent lower that 
the Baseline technology and realized a contribution level 90 percent higher (Result 3). 
 
3. Individual punishment decisions 
      We now turn to a comparison of the patterns of individual punishment decisions across 
treatments. We begin presenting Result 4 about the multiplicity of punishment requests in the 
Baseline treatment. Result 5 provides new insights for the comparison between Baseline and 
Sequential treatments.  
RESULT 4: In the Baseline treatment, approximately half of the times that a subject is punished, 
two or more subjects have requested the punishment.  
Support for Result 4 can be found in Table 5.
13 To interpret this result, it is important to consider 
that in about 92% of the instances one group member could carry out single-handedly the whole 
punishment. A subject could distribute up to seven points of punishment to another subject. A 
total of eight or more points were distributed to a subject only in 8.2% of the cases. It follows 
that the multiplicity of requests to punish the same agent is not a response to the need to punish 
free riders more severely because almost always one agent could have done it alone.   
   One possible explanation for the multiplicity of punishment is a coordination failure when 
subjects have the following preference structure. Let us make the assumption that punishment is 
                                                 
13  Inflicting seven points of punishment has a considerable impact on the earnings of an agent, namely a reduction 
between 40% and 105%. Seven points of punishment reduces earnings by 21 tokens. If everybody free rides, gi=0 
for all i=1,2,3,4 then  1
i π =20. If one agent free rides, g1=0, and all others fully cooperate, gi=20 for i=2,3,4, then 
1
1 π =52 and  1
i π =32 for i=2,3,4.    15
a “second order public good” because the utility derives from having an agent punished. 
Consider a situation where there are agents that are willing to punish free riders if no one else 
does.
 14 Under the above assumption, an agent of the above type will happily free ride on 
punishment if she knows that somebody else will punish. When punishment decisions are 
simultaneous, there is a strategic element in the decisions that relies on the knowledge of the 
preferences of others in the group. Either the agents don’t know exactly the preferences of others 
ore they do. If they don’t know, then Result 4 does register a coordination failure. Had they had 
the information, subjects would have punished differently. If they do know, instead, then the 
preference structure is probably different from the one described above. 
   Another possible explanation is that a subject’s decision to punish does not depend on how 
much others punish the same subject. Stated differently, a subject gains utility from his/her 
personal punishment action and does not care about the total amount of punishment received by 
the targeted subject. This preference structure could describe a strong emotional drive in the 
motivations for punishment. In that case no strategic element would enter into the punishment 
decision and the multiplicity of punishment requests would cease to be a puzzle. It would simply 
reflect the plurality of subjects in each group with a preference for punishment. Moreover, under 
such preference structure, the procedural differences between Baseline and Sequential would be 
irrelevant. 
      Results 5, which will be now presented, provides more support for this “emotional” 
interpretation of punishment decisions than for the “second order public good” interpretation. 
 
                                                 
14 Neurological evidence suggests that sanctioning a norm violator may be a source of utility for the punisher (de 
Quervain et al., 2004).   16
RESULT 5: In the Sequential treatment there is no improvement in coordination in punishment 
in comparison with the Baseline treatment. In particular, we observe across treatments similar 
frequencies of multiple requests to punish the same subject and similar distributions of total 
punishment received by free riders.   
   Result 5 has two components, the multiplicity of requests on the same target and the total 
punishment received by a subject. The similarity in the multiplicity of requests to punish is 
detailed in Table 5. If there is uncertainty in the punishment preferences of others in the group, 
coordination in punishment decisions would be more difficult in the Baseline than in the 
Sequential treatment. In particular, the later movers in the Sequential treatment have additional 
information on the punishment already distributed and could coordinate more easily. As a 
consequence, one may expect in the Sequential data a lower number of group members targeting 
the same agent than in the Baseline. Empirically, that does not seem to be the case. 
   The evidence on total punishment received by free riders provides further support in the same 
direction. When two or more subjects in a group are willing to punish there could be a problem 
in coordinating punishment. If there is an improvement in coordination, one would expect to see 
in the Sequential results less variability in the punishment received by free riders, i.e. a reduction 
in the number of free riders escaping punishment or receiving extemely high punishments. Also 
this conjecture about an improvement in coordination is not supported in the data. We present 
data relative to groups with two or more members who contribute positive amounts and with at 
least one complete free rider (zero contribution). These situations are very common as they 
account for 68.1% of the groups in the Baseline and 70.6% in the Sequential treatment. 
Typically, the complete free riders receive a heavy punishment, an average of 4.83 points in the 
Baseline and of 4.32 points in the Sequential. The actual punishment does vary widely in level   17
from 0 to 19 points. Yet, the empirical distributions of the punishment points targeting complete 
free riders are surprisingly similar between Baseline and Sequential treatment. A Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions cannot reject the equality hypothesis (p-value 
of 0.336, no. obs.=183, 219). We conclude that the additional information provided in the 
Sequential compared to the Baseline treatment does not significantly change either the level or 
the dispersion of punishment decisions (the standard deviation in punishment points actually 
grows slightly from 3.46 in the Baseline to 3.85 in the Sequential). To sum up, there is a puzzle 
here, as the additional information available in the Sequential treatment seems to be ignored. 
 
4. Conclusions 
   We study group cooperation in the provision of a public good under three peer punishment 
institutions, where agents have a costly opportunity to decrease the earnings of others in the 
absence of any personal material benefit. While this study replicates and confirms the robustness 
of the qualitative results of other experiments (Ostrom et al., 1992, Fehr and Gaechter, 2002, 
Sefton et al., 2002), it also points to the significant impact of the specific punishment institution. 
There are three major conclusions.  
   First, the consensual form of peer punishment performs remarkably better than the others. We 
document that when a group member can be targeted for punishment only with the agreement of 
a coalition of agents, the group contributes and earns more than when each agent has free 
discretionality on whom to punish. We call this the “consensus dividend.” This study has 
identified one specific set of rules that promotes a strong effect on group cooperation. It would 
be interesting to characterized the whole class of rules.    18
   Second, introduction of the opportunity to punish has the potential to lower or to increase 
group net earnings.  We find that in two out of three treatments the ability to punish lowers net 
earnings. This loss is especially pronounced during the periods of transition directly after the 
opportunity to punish is provided. One concludes that peer punishment does not automatically 
benefit the group. It crucially depends on the institution that govern peer punishment. 
Anthropological studies of societies without a judicial system have pointed to the danger of the 
spontaneous human tendency to engage in peer punishment (Lowie, 1970, Girard, 1977, p.16-
22). Our findings provide indirect support for the role of a legal system in the administration of 
punishment. Legal systems restrict sanctioning to the violation of shared rules and censor 
individual attempts to punish socially virtuous actions, hence channeling agents’ punishment 
attitudes toward beneficial ends for society (Kosfeld and Riedl, 2004; Casari and Plott, 2003).
15 
More studies are needed to explore the behavioral foundations of punishment through legal 
systems. 
   Our third conclusion concerns the motivations that drive agents to punish. We report of a 
“coordination puzzle.” Changes in strategic incentives and information levels from the Baseline 
to the Sequential treatment are surprisingly irrelevant in peer punishment behavior. This 
similarity in punishment pattern is considered a puzzle because when agents care about the total 
punishment that another agent receives, they should have no objections to others doing the “dirty 
job” of punishing. They should actually prefer it because it saves them the punishment cost. In 
particular, the sequential protocol should favor a better coordination in punishment choices. 
Instead, no significant differences in punishment patterns were uncovered.  Such evidence 
                                                 
15 In line with most of the experimental literature on punishment, this study did not reveal the identity of the 
punisher nor permit counter-punishments, hence preventing revenge. Allowing for it would have further exacerbated 
group conflict and brought up aspects of peer punishment that are detrimental for group performance (Nikiforakis, 
2004; Masclet et al., 2004).   19
supports an interpretation of peer punishment as an emotional response to a norm violation that 
involves no strategic considerations. According to this interpretation subjects do not perceive 
punishment as a second-order public good. When it comes to other-regarding attitudes, emotions 
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Table 1 – Treatment Conditions 
  Baseline Consensual Sequential 
Decisions to contribute are Simultaneous  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Decisions to punish are Simultaneous  Yes  Yes  No 
Punishment when only one agent requested it   Yes  No  Yes 
Number of sessions  4  4  4 
Total number of participants  80  80  80 
Periods without punishment opportunity  10  10  10 
Periods with punishment opportunity  10  10  10 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of individual contributions across experimental sessions 
Treatment  Baseline Consensual  Sequential 
Session  date  3/27  10/15 10/17 10/23 5/22  9/16  10/16 10/21 4/14  10/16 10/20 10/22
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Table 3: Punishment rates by individual level of contribution (Sub-sample) 
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Notes: To partially control for the uneven distribution of contribution levels across treatments, the table includes 
only the sub-sample of experimental data where group contribution was in [10, 40], which constitutes about 58% of 
the sample (1395/2400 obs.). 
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Table 4: Determinants of getting punished: regression results 
  Baseline Sequential  Consensual  All  treatments 
 
High cooperators   0.7999  0.2274  -0.8794  -0.1897 
     (contributions >15 tokens)  (0.8858)  (0.5818)  (0.3183)*  (0.3975) 
Average contribution of   -0.0945  -0.0172  0.0569  0.0025 
     others in the group  (0.1612)  (0.0358)  (0.0193)*  (0.0438) 
Positive deviation from   -0.0707  0.0018  -0.0006  -0.0223 
     average  (0.0648)  (0.0324)  (0.0134)  (0.0252) 
Absolute negative deviation  0.7871  0.6295  0.5688  0.6329 
     from average  (0.0768)***  (0.1142)**  (0.0434)***  (0.0538)*** 
Constant    1.5221 -0.6236  0.1575 1.0468 
 
 
(1.6952) (0.3496)  (0.3700) (0.4299)** 
No. of observations  800  800  800  2400 
R-squared 0.39  0.41  0.57  0.45 
 
Notes: OLS estimator clustered by session. It includes session and period dummies, not reported. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           24









Contribution choices not punished  32.1%  27.4%  66.3% 
Of which: One request to punish  -  -  26.3% 
Contribution choices  punished  67.9%  72.6%  33.9% 
Of which:  One request to punish  32.5%  35.8%  - 
                Two requests to punish  20.0%  23.1%  18.8% 
                Three requests to punish  12.0%  11.1%  10.4% 
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Note: Period by period difference between  sequence with sanction and without sanction 
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Instructions 
 
The following instructions were originally written in Italian. We document the instructions we 
used in the first part of the experiment, which were common to all treatments, and present the 
second part instructions for the Consensual treatment. The instructions for the Baseline and 
Sequential treatments were adapted accordingly. They are available upon request. 
   You are now taking part in an economic experiment on decision-making. If you read the following instructions 
carefully you can, depending on your decision, earn a considerable amount of money. 
During the experiment we shall not speak of Euros but rather of Tokens. During the experiment your entire earning 
will be calculated in Tokens. At the end of the experiment the total amount of tokens you have earned will be 
converted in Euros at the following rate 
1 Token  = 2 cent. Euro 
At the end of the experiment your earnings will be privately paid in cash. To the amount on your screen you must 
add 5 Euro as a lump sum participation fee. 
During the experiment you will not be asked to reveal your identity and your name will not be associated with the 
decisions you are going to take. Moreover, you are not allowed to talk or otherwise communicate with the other 
participants during the experiment. 
 This experiment is divided into two different parts. The following instructions are related to the first stage. The first 
stage consists of 10 periods. 
   Your earnings depend on your decision and on other four participants' decisions. The experiment participants will 
be randomly re–matched after each period and therefore it is highly likely that in each period you will interact with 
different people. You do not know the identity of the people with whom you interact. 
   At the beginning of each period each participant receives 20 points. You task is deciding how you would like to 
use these tokens. The other participants will face the same scenario. You have to decide how many points of the 20 
available you want to contribute to a project. For each point that you keep for yourself you earn an income of one 
Token. The points you have contributed to the project plus the points that all the other four persons have contributed 
are converted in a double quantity of Tokens, which will be evenly divided among these five persons. Therefore, 
after being doubled, you will receive one fifth of the Tokens contributed to the project. To sum up your income 
consists of two parts: 
Your income this period =  direct income               +   income from the project 
                                        =  (20 – your contribution     +   
1/5  x ((sum of yours’ and other four people’s 
             to the project)                          contribution to the project) x 2 ) 
 
   Each of the four persons will receive from the project the same amount that you will. For example, suppose the 
sum of the contributions of the five persons is overall 60 points. In this case each person receives from the project 
60x2/5=24 Tokens. Instead, if the total contribution to the project is 10 points, each of the five persons receives an   28




Sum  of  the  points  contributed    0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Income from the project for each of the 5 
persons  
0 4  8  12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 
 
   For each point that you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 Token. Supposing you contributed this point to 
the project instead, then the total contribution to the project would rise by one point. Your income from the project 
would rise by 1x2/5=0,4 Tokens. Your contribution to the project would also raise the incomes of other persons. 
More precisely, the other four persons will earn an additional 0.4 Tokens each, so that the overall income increase 
for you and the others would be of 2 Tokens. 
After everybody has completed his or her decision, you shall see your period income on the computer screen. 
Moreover, there will be presented the points contributed to the project by each one of the four persons that could 
contribute with you as well as their period income. The identity of these other people will change randomly each 
period. 
This procedure will be repeated 10 periods. 
Are there any questions? If you have questions during the experiment we kindly ask you to raise your hand and 
somebody will assist you in private. 
––––––––––––––––––––– 
   These are the instructions for the second and last part of the experiment. As before, the experiment consists of ten 
periods and in each period you have to make a decision about how many of the 20 tokens available to you. 
  Different than from before, each period is now composed of two phases, the first phase is identical to the procedure 
already described, while in the second phase you may choose to reduce the earnings of other people that have 
profited from the same project. 
In the first phase of a period, you have to make the same type of decision as the one in the sequence already 
described before, and that will here be repeated. 
   At the beginning of each period each participant receives 20 points. You task is deciding how you would like to 
use these tokens. The other participants will face the same scenario. You have to decide how many points of the 20 
available you want to contribute to a project. For each point that you keep for yourself you earn an income of one 
Token. The points you have contributed to the project plus the points that all the other four persons have contributed 
are converted in a double quantity of Tokens, which will be evenly divided among these five persons. Therefore, 
after being doubled, you will receive one fifth of the Tokens contributed to the project. To sum up your income 
consists of two parts: 
Your income for phase one =  direct income               +   income from the project 
                                          =  (20 – your contribution    +   
1/5  x ((sum of yours’ and other four people’s   29
             to the project)                          contribution to the project) x 2 ) 
 
After everybody has completed their decision, you shall see on the computer screen the points contributed to the 
fund by every one of the four persons that could contribute with you as well as their period income. Your decision 
and result will be shown in the first column. The identity of these other people will change randomly each period. 
 
In the second phase of a period you can reduce or leave equal the income of each of the four persons that have 
profited from the same project. Conversely, the other persons can lower your earnings as well.  
Your decision is about distributing points to the other four persons. There is no way for you to know the identity of 
the other persons because they have been randomly selected every period among all participants. You have to 
choose a number of points for each person and you know only his/her contribution decision in the first phase of the 
period. If you do not want to change the earnings of a person choose 0. If you want to reduce the earnings of a 
person, you can distribute a number of points from 0 to 7. For each point distributed, the income in that particular 
person will be reduced by 3 (THREE) tokens. For the person distributing the point, each point costs 1 token. Your 
overall cost is equal to the sum of the points that you have distributed to each one of the other four persons. Your 
maximum cost for distributed points is then 28 tokens (7 tokens times 4 persons). Your cost is zero if you do not 
distribute points to anybody. 
   As it will now be explained, a request to distribute points is not always carried out. For each person, there are two 
cases. 
When ONLY YOU have requested to distribute points to a given person, your decision has no effect. In particular, 
there is no reduction in his/her income and no payment on your side for your request. In the opposite case, when 
BOTH YOU AND OTHERS have requested to distribute points to that same person, then your decision to distribute 
points is carried out. Requests by others to distribute points to that person will also be carried out. In other words, 
there have to be at least two requests to distribute one or more points to the same person in order to carry out a 
reduction of his/her income. It does not matter that the two requests are for distinct amounts. 
 
EXAMPLES. If you distribute 0 points to a person you do not change his/her income. Suppose you request to 
distribute 6 point to a person. Under some conditions this request does not have any effect, while under other 
conditions you reduce his/her income by 18 tokens (6x3). More precisely, if all the others distribute 0 points, your 
request will be ignored. This result will be signaled on the screen at the end of each period by the note “Points 
distributed? NO” in the column corresponding to the concerned person. On the contrary, if at the same time 
somebody else has distributed for instance 2 points to the same person, your request is carried out (an 18–token 
reduction) and you will be charged the fee of 6 tokens. In addition, the request of the other person will be carried 
out. The cumulated effect of the two requests is an overall income reduction of (6+2) x 3 = 24 tokens. This result is 
marked on the screen at the end of the period by the note “YES” in the column corresponding to the concern person. 
 
Your total income at the end of the period will be:   30
 
Your period income = phase one income  – income reduction                  –    cost to distribute points 
     = phase one income  – (sum of received points)x 3   – (total points distributed). 
 
After everybody has completed their decision, you shall see on the computer screen the results for phase two. For 
each person you will learn the cumulative income reduction due to the points distributed. Individual requests to 
distribute points will remain confidential in order to preserve the anonymity of decisions. 
Are there any questions?  31
 
Example of punishment moves in the sequential treatment 
 
 
Step of punishment (targeted agent)  Punisher 
1 2 3 4 
A  B C D E 
B  A E C D 
C  E D A B 
D  C B E A 
E  D A B C 
 
Notes on how to read the table: In step 1, agent A has an opportunity to punish agent B; in step 2, agent D is 
informed of the punishment already received by agent A and has an opportunity to punish more. In step 3, agent E is 
informed of the cumulative punishment already received by agent A and has an opportunity to punish more. 
 
 
 